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Medical privacy and big data: A further reason in 
favour of public universal healthcare coverage
Carissa Véliz
Most people are completely oblivious to the danger that their medical data undergoes as soon as it goes out into 
the burgeoning world of big data. Medical data is financially valuable, and your sensitive data may be shared or 
sold by doctors, hospitals, clinical laboratories, and pharmacies—without your knowledge or consent.1 Medical 
data can also be found in your browsing history, the smartphone applications you use, data from wearables, your 
shopping list, and more. At best, data about your health might end up in the hands of researchers on whose good 
will we depend to avoid abuses of power.2 Most likely, it will end up with data brokers who might sell it to a 
future employer, or an insurance company, or the government. At worst, your medical data may end up in the 
hands of criminals eager to commit extortion or identity theft. In addition to data harms related to exposure and 
discrimination, the collection of sensitive data by powerful corporations risks the creation of data monopolies 
that can dominate and condition access to health care.
This chapter aims to explore the challenge that big data brings to medical privacy. Section I offers a brief 
overview of the role of privacy in medical settings. I define privacy as having one’s personal information and 
one’s personal sensorial space (what I call autotopos) unaccessed. Section II discusses how the challenge of big 
data differs from other risks to medical privacy. Section III is about what can be done to minimise those risks. I 
argue that the most effective way of protecting people from suffering unfair medical consequences is by having a 
public universal healthcare system in which coverage is not influenced by personal data (e.g., genetic 
predisposition, exercise habits, eating habits, etc.).
This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book 
Philosophical Foundations of Medical Law edited by Thana C. de Campos, Jonathan Herring, and Andelka M. Phillips 
due for publication in 2019.
Chapter to be published in: Philosophical Foundations of Medical Law, Oxford University Press (2019).
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1 Adam Tanner, Our Bodies, Our Data. How Companies Make Billions Selling Our Medical Records (Beacon Press 2017) 
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I. Medical privacy
Privacy consists in having one’s personal information and one’s personal sensorial space (what I call autotopos3) 
unaccessed.4 Personal information is the kind of information that someone in a certain society would not want 
to share with just anyone, or information an individual is particularly sensitive about. The autotopos is the kind 
of sensorial space that people in a certain society would not want just anyone, other than themselves (and 
perhaps a very limited number of other people chosen by them), to access. One’s autotopos is accessed when 
someone sensorially enters a culturally established personal zone of one. That is, when another (through direct 
or indirect perception such as cameras and microphones) sees, hears, smells, or touches one in a zone in which 
there are cultural expectations to be free from the eyes, ears, touch, and presence of others (e.g., in the toilet). 
One’s autotopos is also accessed when one is witnessed engaging in some activity or being the subject of some 
event that typically evokes the desire to have no witnesses or very few chosen witnesses (e.g., being naked).5
Medical privacy refers to having personal information about one’s health status unaccessed and having one’s 
autotopos unaccessed in the context of medical settings. Some scholars, such as Anita Allen include within 
medical privacy things like ‘associational privacy (e.g., intimate sharing of death, illness and recovery); 
proprietary privacy (e.g., self-ownership and control over personal identifiers, genetic data, and biospecimens); 
and decisional privacy (e.g., autonomy and choice in medical decision-making).’6 This over-inclusion is 
mistaken. What Allen calls ‘associational privacy’ can be explained through a combination of informational and 
sensorial access: we do not want non-intimate people to see us when we are ill or dying; we do not want them to 
know about our illnesses. Similarly, with so-called ‘proprietary privacy,’ if we worry about the information that 
genetic data carries and the possible consequences of that information getting shared inappropriately, then it is a 
matter of privacy, but one that is covered by informational privacy. If the worry is rather financial (i.e., about 
who should profit from patients’ genetic data), then it is proprietary issue, not a privacy one. Finally, what Allen 
calls ‘decisional privacy’ is rather a matter having to do with the interest we have in being allowed to do as we 
please without interference.7 In other words, it is a matter of freedom and autonomy, not privacy.
One might wonder what makes the two species—informational and sensorial access—part of the genus of 
privacy. The unity of the category of privacy is founded on the notion of being personally unaccessed and the 
kinds of interests we have in not being accessed by others. Privacy protects us from a) certain kinds of harms 
that may come about as a result of other people having access to our personal life (e.g., discrimination, identity 
theft, etc.), b) the demands of sociality, c) being judged and possibly ridiculed by others (and thus from self-
conscious negative emotions such as shame and embarrassment), and d) the discomfort of being watched, heard, 
and so on.8
The medical context is an important home for privacy. Visits to the doctor’s office or the hospital create moments 
of great vulnerability for patients and their families. People typically do not like just anyone knowing about their 
diseases (particularly when it comes to certain kinds of diseases that carry more stigma with them), and we do 
3 From the Greek auto (self) and topos (place or space). My thanks to Roger Crisp for suggesting the term.
4 The adjective ‘unaccessed’ is not found in dictionaries, but there is no suitable existing term to convey in one word the 
property of not having been accessed. ‘Inaccessible’ denotes the property of not being able to be accessed, which is 
different from being accessible yet not actually accessed. Analogous differentiations exist in English that use the same 
prefixes (e.g. indisputable/undisputed, inalterable/unaltered, etc.).
5 Carissa Véliz, ‘On Privacy’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2017) Chapter 4
6 Anita Allen, ‘Privacy and Medicine’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) < Available 
at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/privacy-medicine/> last accessed 27 November 2018
7 William A Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality, and the Law’ (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 269
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not like being seen at our worst—when we are sick, worried, and stripped down of makeup and our everyday 
attire. Yet privacy losses are inevitable in medical contexts. For patients to get adequate care, they have little 
choice but to surrender both sensitive information about themselves and access to their bodies to healthcare 
professionals. Likewise, for subjects to participate in health research, they must give up some degree of 
informational and sensorial privacy. It is the duty of healthcare professionals and researchers, however, to 
minimise privacy losses, to show consideration towards patients and subjects, and avoid any unnecessary 
exposure.
Thus, healthcare professionals take care to protect patients’ autotopos. Sensorial privacy is protected through 
bedside manners (e.g., looking away while the patient undresses), and other practices designed to limit exposure 
to patients’ autotopos (e.g., the use of hospital gowns, curtains, etc.).
Similarly, confidentiality protects informational privacy. Confidentiality refers to the moral duties of non-
disclosure of information shared in the context of a fiduciary, contractual or professional relationship such as 
that of the lawyer-client relationship or the doctor-patient one. The Hippocratic Oath, which set the historical 
foundations of medical ethics, already took into account privacy, and included a vow not to speak of what is seen 
and heard in the course of treatment.9 In addition to being a means of respecting a patient’s right to privacy, 
confidentiality protects a patient’s autonomy by sheltering them from external interference and possible criticism 
about their decisions.10 Confidentiality also protects patients from possible stigmatisation and discrimination 
(e.g., at work, or within the family). It makes it more likely that patients will seek medical care (thus keeping 
medical costs lower through routine check-ups that allow prompt medical attention), be honest with doctors 
(making medical care more accurate), and be more willing to participate in health research.11
In the context of medical research, ethics committees and institutional review boards make sure research 
subjects’ privacy is adequately protected. Confidentiality requires that research subjects not be identifiable. To 
fulfil that objective, researchers anonymise data through aggregating it and using ‘identifiers’ (as opposed to 
names).12 Further protection of privacy is traditionally afforded to research subjects through the use of informed 
consent. In order to give consent, participants must know what data will be collected about them, and how it will 
be managed. Subjects should also be informed of their right to withdraw from research at any time, and they 
should be told what would happen to their data in that scenario (ideally, it should be destroyed).
Anonymisation and informed consent have never been perfect tools for protecting privacy. Genetic data, for 
example, resists anonymisation because it is unique to each individual. Similarly, in some cases it is impossible to 
extract valid informed consent (e.g., if a research subject is incapacitated). Notwithstanding their very significant 
limitations, however, it is widely accepted that they are usually good enough tools for protecting privacy, 
particularly given that they can be complemented with other good practices to compensate for their 
shortcomings. For instance, a study using genetic data can be kept in a closed environment (e.g., using 
computers that are not connected to the Internet, and in a locked room to which only authorised researchers 
have access, etc.) to make sure that data is not linked to other data that could expose individuals. Similarly, in 
cases in which informed consent from a patient is not possible, consent from family members can act as a proxy. 
As it will become apparent in the next section, big data complicates the use of both anonymisation and informed 
consent to the point of risking making them null.
9 ‘Oath of Hippocrates’ in WT Reich (ed), Encyclopedia of Bioethics (Macmillan 1995) 2632
10 Allen (n 6)
11 For more on the legal nature of confidentiality, see Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2016) 224
12 Cited by Anita Allen, ‘Privacy and Medicine’ (n 6) Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Role of Institutional Review 
Boards in Health Services Research Data Privacy Protection, Protecting Data Privacy in Health Services Research (National 
Academies Press 2000) < Available at: https://www.nap.edu/read/9952/chapter/1> last accessed 27 November 2018
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After this brief overview of the role of privacy in medical settings, I will go on to detail the opportunities and 
privacy perils that big data presents in medical settings.
II. The challenge of big data for medical privacy
The arrival of big data promises to revolutionise medicine. With technological innovation, however, often come 
new ethical challenges. As we find ourselves in novel situations, the need to foresee possible risks and benefits 
becomes crucial to make the most of available technologies while avoiding as many negative consequences as 
possible.
In what follows I will cover some of the medical advantages that big data may offer before going on to explore 
possible privacy pitfalls and suggestions to minimise risks.
Big data in medicine
The most influential definition of big data outlines it in terms of three dimensions: volume (scale), velocity, and 
variety.13,14 Big data’s value rests in its capacity to combine large amounts of information, faster than ever, and 
from a variety of sources, into a single dataset that can allow the identification of correlations that would 
otherwise remain undetected.15
Data aggregated from sources outside of traditional medical settings can be very valuable for medical purposes. 
At Johns Hopkins, for example, researchers could predict the location and time of a flu outbreak based on 
tweets.16 At Boston Children’s Hospital, researchers could predict, track, and map obesity rates at a 
neighbourhood using Facebook ‘likes.’17
It is widely believed that big data holds incredible potential to advance the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention 
of diseases through resolving some current problems in medicine. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have 
been crucial in the development of rigorous medicine by providing evidence on the efficacy and safety of drugs 
and interventions of various kinds. However, RCTs are expensive; their findings are both too broad (given 
problems of statistical sampling, a treatment found to be beneficial in a trial may not be beneficial for any given 
individual) and narrow (trial population and setting may not be representative of the general practice); the 
randomisation of patients may be ethically dubious, as some patients will receive better treatment than others, 
whether the better treatment is the existing care or the intervention being tested; and there are usually long 
delays before RCT results can translate into common practice. Big data aspires to solve these issues by having 
13 Doug Laney, ‘3D data management: Controlling data volume, velocity and variety’ (2001) 6 META Group Research 
Note
14 Laney’s conceptualisation has become the classic definition. Subsequent approaches have added other elements to 
big data. See, for example, M Ali-ud-din Khan, Muhammad Fahim Uddin and Navarun Gupta, ‘Seven V’s of Big Data. 
Understanding Big Data to extract Value’ (Proceedings of Zone 1 Conference of the American Society for Engineering 
Education, Bridgeport, CT, April 2014) doi: 10.1109/ASEEZone1.2014.6820689. In their paper, Khan et al add validity, 
volatility, veracity, and value to elements of big data. Most of these components, however, seem more normative than 
descriptive. Sometimes data used in big data analyses have little veracity or validity, leading to errors. While it is 
important to emphasise the desirability of features such as veracity and validity to create value, they do not seem intrinsic 
to a definition of big data. Inaccurate data can still form part of big data.
15 Jane H Thorpe and Elizabeth A Gray, ‘Big data and public health: Navigating privacy laws to maximize potential’ 
(2015) 130(2) Public Health Reports 171 PubMed PMID: 25729109.
16 DA Broniatowski, MJ Paul and M Dredze, ‘National and local influenza surveillance through Twitter: an analysis of the 
2012–2013 influenza epidemic’ (2013) 8(12) PLoS One e83672 PubMed PMID: 24349542.
17 R Chunara et al, ‘Assessing the online social environment for surveillance of obesity prevalence’ (2013) 8 PLoS One 
e61373 PubMed PMID: 23637820.
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access to inexpensive data—generated as a by-product of patient care and people’s day to day lives—that is 
specific to individuals and that assembles information from large groups of people, therefore being adequately 
narrow and broad. Big data research also avoids the ethical dubiousness of randomisation, and treatment could 
potentially be much more immediately available.18
Big data may thus greatly advance personalised medicine. At least for some kinds of diseases such as cancer, 
treatments are sometimes only effective in a small number of patients. There are many different varieties of 
cancer, and people with different genomes react differently to drugs. Big data holds the promise of being able to 
develop precision medicine on the basis of genomic profiles.19 Rather than prescribe a drug tested on a small 
sample of the population in the hopes that a patient will react the way most people did in the sample, analyses 
based on big data will not have to hope for the best. Instead of working from a mere sample of the population, all 
subjects can be profiled individually, and the drug that has been shown to work better for people closest to a 
patient’s profile can be prescribed.
Finally, big data may uncover hitherto unsuspected correlations by taking into account data about people’s living 
environments, their responsibility for their health (exercise, eating, and drinking habits, etc.), social relations, 
and more.
Although the promise of big data in medicine is great, it is worth taking into account that, so far, it is mainly just 
a promise, and one that has been there for decades. For all their limits, RCTs are still the best source of medical 
evidence we have, and there is a chance big data may never live up to its many expectations. As Sir Richard Peto, 
Professor of Medical Statistics and Epidemiology at the University of Oxford points out, ‘[y]ou need large-scale, 
randomized evidence to answer a lot of questions, and I think the claim that database analysis will do so isn’t 
justified.’20
Privacy and other derivative risks
All the possible medical benefits of big data, assuming they will come, will arise as a result of having more data 
about patients. With more data, however, come more privacy risks. Any time data is collected, there is a risk that 
information may be abused or may end up in the wrong hands. In the past, however, risks were partly minimised 
by technological limits. When health records or data from studies was collected and stored in paper in hospitals 
and doctors’ offices, it was usually kept under lock and key in a cabinet, and the possibility of it reaching a great 
number of people was highly unlikely. As soon as health records become electronic, and are stored in computers 
with Internet access, the risk of data breaches, leaks, and misuses, increases. Any data kept on a device connected 
to the Internet is potentially hackable. And any hacked data can end up being exposed and possibly sold on the 
dark web. Data breaches are common in medical settings. Just in 2015, a particularly bad year, over 112 million 
health records were breached only in the United States.21 While the number of people (health records) affected 
was lower in 2017, the number of healthcare data security incidents was higher than in past years, and seems to 
be on the rise, which suggests that patients’ health records are increasingly at risk.22
18 DC Angus, ‘Fusing Randomized Trials With Big Data: The Key to Self-learning Health Care Systems?’ (2015) 314 
JAMA 767 PubMed PMID: 26305643.
19 J Andreu-Perez et al, ‘Big data for health’ (2015) 19(4) IEEE J Biomed Health Inform 1193, 1197 PubMed PMID: 
26173222.
20 Quoted by Tanner (n 1) 164.
21 Dan Munro, ‘Data Breaches In Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million Records in 2015’ Forbes (31 December 2015) < 
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-million-
records-in-2015/#5118fabc7b07>
22 HIPAA Journal post, ‘Largest Healthcare Data Breaches of 2017’ (4 January 2018) < Available at: https://
www.hipaajournal.com/largest-healthcare-data-breaches-2017/> last accessed 27 November 2018
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In addition to the risk of having Electronic Health Records (EHRs), privacy risks are exacerbated by big data 
through the amount of data collected and the sources it comes from. Medical data does not only come from 
traditional sources like EHRs and genetic and microbiomic sequencing data, but also from smartphone 
applications, data brokers, social networks, Internet searches, environmental data (e.g., air quality data), ambient 
sensors, wearables, etc.23 Health data reaches beyond the doctor’s office and the hospital into everyday life. Big 
data will be able to correlate relationships between health and buying habits, movement tracking, sleeping habits, 
social relations, and more. The objective is to be able to answer questions such as: Do Facebook friends influence 
one’s life choices? Is using a bicycle to work healthier than walking? Is the air in some cities so polluted that it 
can affect life expectancy?24
Thus, data that may be used for medical (and other) purposes can include data that subjects voluntarily give up, 
data inferred from aggregated data, data that individuals may have no knowledge is being collected, and data 
that could potentially be collected against the wishes of data subjects (e.g., browsing history). All this 
information can be stored indefinitely, which, in time, allows data to be used for purposes other than that for 
which it was collected.25 Some of these uses can hurt data subjects.
Inappropriate uses of medical data abound and will probably increase as the data economy expands. Private 
corporations’ use of medical data is an important concern when companies get involved with healthcare. For 
example, Google’s DeepMind has been involved with the NHS in the United Kingdom to develop a clinical 
application for kidney injury. Millions of medical records were shared with the company without informing 
patients or asking for their consent. Many months later, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s 
Office ruled it unlawful.26 Even though DeepMind had made public assurances that the medical data would not 
be linked to Google accounts, products or services, there was never any legal guarantee that they would keep 
their word. The company has recently been accused of breaking its promise after it announced that Google 
would absorb DeepMind’s medical division.27 At the moment, because it is not in the position of a health care 
professional, Google does not owe duties of confidentiality to patients. People’s medical data could be used for all 
sorts of purposes: to be sold to third parties, for targeted marketing, for personalised pricing (i.e., selling certain 
products at a higher price to people who want or need them the most), or for developing Artificial Intelligence 
tools that can be applied in unknown ways in the future. It has been suggested that DeepMind’s interest in 
helping develop this application relied from the start on acquiring data for its machine learning commercial 
research projects.28 A corporation may use sensitive data surrendered in the belief that it might help patients in 
questionable ways.
A related significant concern that is not directly about privacy, but rather a derivative worry about the power 
that comes with access to private data, is that big corporations that have more financial and technological 
capabilities than governments will monopolise access to health care. Dominance in data collection leads to 
23 Andreu-Perez et al (n 19) 1194
24 GM Weber, KD Mandl and IS Kohane, ‘Finding the missing link for big biomedical data’ (2014) 311 JAMA 2479 
PubMed PMID: 24854141.
25 Thorpe and Gray (n 15)
26 Julia Powles, ‘Why are we giving away our most sensitive health data to Google?’ The Guardian (5 July 2017) < 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/05/sensitive-health-information-deepmind-google>
27 Margi Murphy, ‘Privacy concerns as Google asorbs DeepMind’s health division’ The Telegraph (13 November 2018) < 
Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/11/13/privacy-concerns-google-absorbs-deepminds-health-
division/>
28 Julia Powles and Hal Hodson, ‘Google DeepMind and healthcare in an age of algorithms’ (2017) 7(4) Health and 
Technology 351–67 < Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12553-017-0179-1> last accessed 27 
November 2018 PubMed PMID: 29308344.
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monopolies, and dominance in the collection of sensitive data can lead to particularly problematic monopolies. 
Google, for example, could hold a monopolistic position of power over health analytics on account of being the 
institution holding more data on individuals around the world, because they may develop the most advanced 
algorithms for medical diagnosis with that data, and other possible competitors who do not have as much data 
will not stand a chance against the titan. As things stand, DeepMind is getting patients’ data for free, and yet it 
could potentially retain full power over the knowledge and algorithms that it develops from its collaboration 
with the NHS—as well as the profits.29 If we allow corporations to hold power over data and access to health 
care, prices could soar, and medical attention could be given to individuals only under unacceptable data deals 
(e.g., in addition to payment, forcing patients to give up all of their personal data in exchange for medical care).
Other privacy-related risks of big data include people being discriminated against at their workplace on account 
of their medical history (e.g., for suffering from a certain disease, or because they are pregnant). Insurance 
companies could also take advantage of medically relevant information to charge some people more that others 
(e.g., penalise those who do not exercise enough, or worse, those who have genes that are deemed risky). 
Pharmaceutical companies could engage in price discrimination by identifying people who desperately need a 
medicine that can only be bought from them and charge more for it. Criminals can also extort patients, 
threatening to expose sensitive images or information about them if they do not give up money. In 2017, a 
criminal group gained access to data from a cosmetic surgery clinic and extorted patients, asking for a bitcoin 
ransom. Hackers ended up publishing more than 25,000 private photos, including nude ones, and personal data 
including passport scans and national insurance numbers.30 Another common criminal act is medical identity 
theft, committed by uninsured individuals who need medical care and steal another person’s identity to get it.31
In a nutshell, the challenge for big data in medicine is to develop personalised medicine with the knowledge and 
consent of data subjects, protecting people’s privacy, and minimising risks that stem from the collection and use 
of sensitive data. In what follows I explain why anonymisation and consent are necessary but insufficient tools to 
meet this challenge.
The limits of anonymisation and consent in the context of big data
As was mentioned in Section I, heretofore, medical ethics has relied on anonymisation and informed consent to 
protect people’s privacy. Big data, however, makes both of these tools difficult, if not impossible, to implement. 
Let us consider anonymisation first.
Anonymisation has always been a challenge. Studies that involve photographs, for example, or genetic data, can 
be hard or impossible to anonymise.32 But, for the most part, other kinds of data could be more easily 
anonymised by stripping away information that could identify individuals. The use of big data, however, makes 
anonymisation a near impossible feat, because the more data points we have about individuals, the easier it is to 
identify them.33 There is usually only one individual of your height who works and lives where you do, for 
example. It only takes two or three data points to identify anyone.34 Given the increasing amount of electronic 
publicly available data that we have on people, re-identification will continue to get easier.35 Furthermore, for 
data to reveal insights, it must be linked to the correct person to ensure appropriate diagnosis and treatment.36
29 Ibid
30 Alex Hern, ‘Hackers publish private photos from cosmetic surgery clinic’ The Guardian (31 May 2017) < Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/31/hackers-publish-private-photos-cosmetic-surgery-clinic-bitcoin-
ransom-payments>
31 Tanner (n 1) 98
32 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The collection, linking and use of data in biomedical research and health care: ethical 
issues (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, February 2015)
33 Weber, Mandl and Kohane (n 24)
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Therefore, every person must be uniquely tagged with a medical identifier, making it all the more easier to re-
identify individuals.
Even if it were possible to anonymise data in a secure way, the analysis of aggregated data can also result in 
group-level harms such as stigmatisation and discrimination. Such harms can impact everyone in a given group 
and not only the people who might have consented to research.37
Such are the limits of anonymisation in the context of big data. Let us now turn to consent. Big data is designed 
to reveal unforeseen correlations, which implies that there will be a significant degree of uncertainty about future 
findings. Even if data subjects were to agree to give up their data, consent cannot be fully informed because 
subjects cannot be told about future uses and consequences of their data, as not even researchers can know what 
kind of correlations may be unveiled, and they often cannot guarantee how this data will be used.38
One might be tempted to think that consent is unnecessary because the risks involved in big data research are 
minimal. However, given the uncertainty over what kinds of information may be revealed in the future on the 
basis of collected data, and given the possibility of leaks and hacks, it is hard to make a case that the risks are 
indeed minimal.39
Anonymisation and informed consent, then, cannot protect medical privacy in the digital age, and they do 
nothing to avoid concerns about power that result from the collection of sensitive data. If the traditional tools of 
medicine are insufficient to protect patients in big data contexts, how can risks be minimised? I turn to this 
question next.
III. Minimising risks
Part of what made anonymisation and consent appropriate tools in the past were complementary practices that 
could strengthen protection, such as keeping paper files in a locked cabinet to which only approved researchers 
had access. In what follows are some complementary practices that can help minimise risks in the era of big data.
Data practices must be better regulated to protect data subjects.40 Inappropriate uses of data, including the re-
identification of individuals in anonymised databases and discrimination, should be made illegal. Similarly, we 
should make it illegal to link health information from research databases to other data resources if data subjects 
have not given their explicit consent.41 If risks will be imposed on data subjects (for example, by inferring 
sensitive information from non-sensitive information, or by storing data in a way that could allow for 
34 YA de Montjoye et al, ‘Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility’ (2013) 3 Sci Rep 1376 PubMed 
PMID: 23524645.; YA de Montjoye et al, ‘Identity and privacy. Unique in the shopping mall: on the reidentifiability of 
credit card metadata’ (2015) 347 Science 536 PubMed PMID: 25635097.
35 Tanner (n 1) 91
36 Andreu-Perez et al (n 19) 1204
37 Brent Daniel Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘The Ethics of Big Data: Current and Foreseeable Issues in Biomedical 
Contexts’ (2016) 22(2) Science and Engineering Ethics 303 PubMed PMID: 26002496.
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a step in the right direction, but it might not be enough to protect 
data subjects’ medical data; it is too early to tell, as much depends on how the Regulation will be interpreted and 
enforced. The recommendations here go beyond the GDPR and are specific to medical data. See Council Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ 2 
119/1 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1525272154893&uri=CELEX:32016R0679> accessed 27 
November 2018
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identification and misuse), medical data should not be used from people who have not agreed to be research 
subjects, as when data is analysed from social media or open web forums, or when doctors, hospitals, or 
pharmacies share medical data with data analysis companies without patients’ knowledge. Policing such 
behaviour, however, can be quite a challenge, and even with strong regulations in place, risks from privacy losses 
do not disappear. For this reason, limits to how data is used are not enough, and further limits on the access to 
data should be put in place.
Consent has always been a valuable guardian of access to data, but its practice must be updated to fit big data 
contexts. One possibility is to put the onus on patients—to give them control of their data and make them 
responsible for it. Even acknowledging that the kind of consent being secured is limited and not fully informed 
due to the uncertainty surrounding big data, individuals could be asked consent for each use of their data. This 
approach is incredibly burdensome, however, both for institutions and individuals. It is too impractical to ask for 
consent to every individual for every single use of data from every source. Making individuals responsible for 
their health data will likely result in them being overwhelmed with consent requests, which may lead to them 
oversharing and regretting it when it is too late to recall their data. A more promising proposal is ‘tiered’ 
consent, in which data subjects can choose specific future uses of their data (e.g., someone can decide their data 
can be used only for cancer research).42 Along these lines, researchers in the United Kingdom have developed 
an interface that allows patients to give ‘dynamic consent’ to the use of their data, that is, that allows them to 
engage in research studies and change their consent preferences at any time in narrow and broad ways.43
Another option is to have consent models mediated by third parties that negotiate agreements on behalf of data 
subjects. Data trusts could be modelled after labour unions. This proposal could work quite well, if people were 
to organise and data experts could advise data trusts. In terms of feasibility, however, it is unclear whether there 
is enough awareness of privacy issues in our societies for people to be willing to organise and defend their rights. 
But perhaps as privacy-related incidents such as identity theft and extortion continue to rise, data subjects will 
take steps to organise themselves into groups that can better stand up for their rights against institutions.
Related to consent, if private corporations are to responsibly manage sensitive data about people from which 
medical information may be inferred, they should have similar confidentiality responsibilities as doctors 
currently have. If a company betrays the trust of users by misusing their medical data, they should lose their 
licence to manage medical data.
Companies and institutions should invest in research, software, and infrastructure to manage medical data in the 
safest way possible. Encryption of data is a must, and security methods such as differential privacy44—whereby 
mathematical noise is inserted into a database to camouflage individual data records—should be implemented. 
There should also be plans to delete data once it has been used. Only then can patients’ consent be valid, as only 
then will they know how their data will be used. Without an expiry date, data can be used in any way in the 
future. Data deletion is also an effective way to minimise the risks of misuse.45
41 IS Kohane and RB Altman, ‘Health-information altruists--a potentially critical resource’ (2005) 353(19) N Engl J Med 
2074 PubMed PMID: 16282184.
42 Mittelstadt and Floridi (n 37)
43 Jane Kaye et al, ‘Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century research networks’ (2015) 23 European 
Journal of Human Genetics 141 PubMed PMID: 24801761.
44 Cynthia Dwork, ‘Differential Privacy’ in Michele Bugliesi et al (eds), International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, 
and Programming Automata, Languages and Programming, vol 4052 (Springer 2006)
45 Carissa Véliz, ‘Tus datos son tóxicos’ El País (8 April 2018) < Available at: https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2018/04/06/
actualidad/1523030681_007734.html>
Medical privacy and big data: A further reason in favour of public universal healthcare coverage 9
A
uthor M
anuscrip
t
A
uthor M
anuscrip
t
A
uthor M
anuscrip
t
Apart from making bad practices illegal, giving patients some degree of control over their data through some 
form of consent, holding corporations to respect confidentiality, implementing the best possible security 
protocols, and deleting data, regulation must ensure that private companies do not monopolise medical data. 
Above and beyond the risks that can spill outside the doctors’ office, medical risks are perhaps the most 
important to take into account in the context of medical settings. For big data to be a positive force in medicine, 
we must ensure that all data subjects on whose data it relies to improve can benefit equally from it. Privacy risks 
are an obstacle to this objective because people can be discriminated against on account of data about them—
they can be denied services, or charged more for them. Data risks related to monopolies can also make prices 
increase, allowing data titans to unduly privately benefit from data they have harvested from the public.
These risks provide a strong argument in favour of having universal health care.46 The most effective way of 
protecting people from suffering unfair consequences in medical settings is by having public universal health 
care coverage in which citizens contribute to the system through taxes and not through dues based on data about 
them. Such a system would do nothing to prevent work discrimination or extortion resulting from medical data 
misuses, but it can minimise medical identity theft, and most importantly, it can guarantee that people will not 
suffer unfairness in access to healthcare on account of health data monopolies or discrimination.
A strong public and universal health care system not only provides the most robust protection citizens can get to 
ensure fair access to heath care—it is also the kind of entity that has enough power to negotiate fair deals with 
corporations. The NHS, for instance, has enough data about patients, enough medical technology, and enough 
connections to research institutions, to be able to collaborate with corporations without buckling under their 
weight. In the future, it ought to negotiate a better deal with companies like Google so that patients’ interests are 
better protected. Medical data is both very sensitive and very valuable, and health care institutions should not be 
giving it out without patients’ consent and without ensuring that they will retain some power over the resulting 
technology.
Some objections
The personal responsibility objection
I have argued that privacy risks are dangerous in relation to medical data because they may result in people 
being treated differently from each other on the basis of personal information about them. But it could be 
objected that people ought to be treated differently in virtue of how responsible they are for their health 
conditions. In other words, it could be argued that we should welcome big data analyses even when they come at 
the cost of losing medical privacy because they will enable accurate attribution of responsibility within 
healthcare settings, so that patients who are less responsible for their disease get more benefits, and patients who 
are more responsible get less, and that would be fairer than all patients being treated equally even when some of 
them might be responsible for their own misfortune. However, it will be hard to make sure institutions are not 
discriminating people on the basis of information that should not be taken into account, such as genetic 
makeup, or race. Moreover, the attribution of responsibility is bound to be very controversial. First, algorithms 
on which big data depend can and do make mistakes.47 Second, this kind of assessment is not a purely scientific 
determination, but a value laden philosophical task that depends on how we conceptualise responsibility.
Furthermore, health is largely a matter of luck: a combination of having the right genes, living in a healthy 
environment, having had the right education, etc. Cancer, for instance, is the most common cause of death in the 
46 There are other arguments in favour of universal healthcare, but those are outside the scope of this paper. For an 
overview of some of these arguments, see Norman Daniels, ‘ Justice and Access to Health Care.’ Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy.
47 For a good compendium of such mistakes, see Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Kindle edition, Penguin 
2016)
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world, and a recent study suggests most cancers are the result of random mutations.48 Given the weight of luck 
in health status, an important factor for ensuring all citizens have a fair equality of opportunity is providing 
universal access to healthcare. Maintaining health contributes to being able to access the wide range of 
opportunities available in a given society. If we want to protect equality of opportunity, then offering universal 
access to healthcare will contribute to setting-off the inequalities that are brought about by sheer luck.
The free rider objection
I am proposing two things that may seem in tension with each other. On the one hand, I am proposing asking 
for informed consent for the collection of medical data, and at the same time, I am defending a universal system 
of public healthcare. Believers in desert might want to object that it would be unfair for people who do not give 
their consent for the collection of their medical data to benefit from a medical system that depends on that data 
to advance knowledge.
This objection, I suspect, comes from underestimating the cost of donating data; since there is nothing it feels 
like to have one’s data collected, it is understandable for someone to think that people who do not donate their 
data are just being selfish. But the risks of sharing medical data are real, as examples show, and they are likely to 
become riskier as time goes by and there is more data about people to be aggregated. Donating medical data 
should thus be thought analogous to participating in clinical research: because it is a risky endeavour, subjects 
should not be compelled to participate. Participation should always be free, and withdrawal from participation 
without reprisal must always be an option. Importantly, according to the Declaration of Helsinki, regarded by 
most as one of the main guidelines for medical research, ‘[w]hile the primary purpose of medical research is to 
generate new knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research 
subjects.’49
People who do not donate their medical data are no worse than people who have not participated in medical 
research and yet benefit from medical advancements. To recruit data subjects, researchers should do what 
clinical researchers do to convince people to participate in research: make sure appropriate safety measures are 
put in place (which, in the case of data, has to include a plan to delete data), ask for informed consent, and give 
people enough compensation to make it worth their while to participate.
IV. Conclusion
Big data promises to significantly enhance the power of medicine to diagnose, treat, and prevent of diseases. 
With this promise, however, come significant privacy risks to data subjects who could suffer unfair 
discrimination, exposure, extortion, and limited access to healthcare. To minimise these risks, inappropriate uses 
of data should be outlawed, and consent must be sought from data subjects, even if it is a limited form of consent 
such as tiered consent. Companies managing sensitive information must also be held to respect confidentiality 
regarding medical data. Security measures like encryption and other cryptographic methods such as differential 
privacy should be implemented. Data should be deleted after use. Finally, corporations should not be allowed to 
hold complete power over medical big data. If corporations monopolise medical big data, the best treatments in 
medicine may only be available to the rich, or to ordinary people under unfair data deals. As things stand, there 
do not seem to be enough structures to guarantee that public goods and interests will prevail above private 
interests in the use of big data for medical purposes. If, however, public healthcare systems manage to negotiate 
power over big data through harnessing the weight of the data they have, their connections to research 
institutions, the trust of their patients (if they manage to keep it), and the ability of government to regulate 
48 C Tomasetti, L Li, and B Vogelstein, ‘Stem cell divisions, somatic mutations, cancer etiology, and cancer prevention’ 
(2017) 355(6331) Science 1330 PubMed PMID: 28336671.
49 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
(adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly 1964) (Note of Clarification added 2002) article 8
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medical settings, fruitful collaborations between the private and public sectors may ensue, and patients may have 
their privacy and interests better protected.
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